A friend forwarded me an offering memo last spring. The projected return was 14% a year, secured against property, with a track record of three successful projects. The document was polished and the numbers were specific. Before examining any of that, I asked one question: how often do investments of this type actually deliver what they project? That question is the base rate test, and it is the first move in any honest evaluation.
What a base rate is

A base rate is how often something has happened in the past, across everyone who tried. Ignoring it has a name in psychology, the base rate fallacy, and investing is where that habit costs the most. Instead of examining this investment in detail, you step back and ask which category it belongs to, and how that category has performed as a whole. Psychologist Daniel Kahneman calls this the outside view, and it runs against the grain of how investment decisions normally feel. The formal method built on it is called reference class forecasting.
The inside view is the detailed examination: the sponsor’s experience, the property, the legal structure, the projections. It feels more informative because it is full of specifics. The base rate is a statistic about strangers, and the mind discounts it for exactly that reason.
Choosing the reference class honestly

The test only works when the category is drawn at the right width. A 14% property note belongs with private credit deals and small development financings. It does not belong next to Treasury yields, and it does not belong next to your cousin’s well-chosen rental house, which is the flattering comparison the memo quietly invites you to make.
Pick the class that matches the deal’s structure, debt load, and sponsor experience. The US Bureau of Labor Statistics has tracked business survival for decades, and the headline result has been steady: roughly half of employer firms survive their fifth year. That number belongs in the room whenever a small venture promises steady double-digit returns. Drawing the class too narrowly is the most common way people fool themselves, and it rarely feels like fooling yourself while you do it.
Running the test on familiar claims

Three examples, each a pitch I have seen in the last few years.
A rental portfolio promising 12% cash-on-cash returns, financed with 70% debt. The honest reference class is small landlords carrying heavy debt, and its history includes rate resets, vacancy months, and repair years that the projection smooths into a single line. A base rate of two good years in three is enough to make 12% a ceiling rather than a forecast.
A fund with three exceptional years and a confident manager. The reference class is active managers with a hot streak, and the data published in S&P Dow Jones Indices’ SPIVA scorecards has been consistent for twenty years: a large majority of active funds lag their index over long horizons, and the lagging is worst for the funds that happened to be hottest early on. Three years of results is a sample, and a small one.
A new asset class offering 20% yield with “institutional-grade” risk controls. The reference class is double-digit yield promises, and it contains nearly every blow-up of the last two decades. The base rate for this category is so poor that the burden of proof sits entirely with the sponsor.
When the base rate points the wrong way
A statistic about the past is weak evidence when the category is genuinely new. Index funds looked like a mediocre idea in 1976. Early venture portfolios in new industries had no reference class at all. When a real structural change is underway, the outside view can be too pessimistic, and the people who see the change early are the ones who get paid for it.
The discipline is to make the update visible. Start from the category’s history, then let specific evidence move you off it one documented fact at a time. A working product, audited numbers, and a sponsor with skin in the game are reasons to adjust. A polished memo is a reason to look harder.
What the test does for you
The base rate will not make the decision. It sets the odds you are negotiating with. Run it before the memo’s specifics take over the conversation, and most of the clear mistakes eliminate themselves. The inside view will always feel more convincing, because it arrives with names and dates and photographs while the outside view arrives with a percentage. Letting the percentage speak first is how a portfolio avoids the losses that statistics kept warning about.




